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The surgeon said, “So, it’s your decision.”
I said, “I’m going to leave it in your hands.”
—Esophagectomy patient
Every day thousands of doctors help patients with deci-sions about medical interventions. A voluminous liter-
ature reflecting the views of philosophers, bioethicists,
and legal scholars provides expert advice. Physicians
learn from the literature that they are expected to help
patients make “an autonomous authorization . . . of a med-
ical intervention . . .”1 and to “inform their patients about
the nature of their condition and its expected course, about
the benefits and risks of the proposed treatment, and of
alternative treatment or nontreatment.”2 The emphasis on
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autonomy is accompanied by clear warnings against
physician paternalism. Some scholars have questioned
the doctrine of informed consent,3,4 recognizing prob-
lems with the complexity of medical information,5 the
patient’s confusion and vulnerability when he or she is
ill,6,7 ambiguity and inconsistency among legal interpre-
tations,8 and lack of physician compliance.3,8 Legal and
institutional policy requirements emphasize disclosure of
risk and prognosis to prevent lawsuits. Patients may wish
to leave worrying about these troublesome matters to the
physician.7 Practitioners are caught in the middle of this
unresolved issue.
The purpose of our study was to learn what patients
believe about consent and decision making on the basis
of their own experience. We asked postoperative pa-
tients to tell us about the values and beliefs that guided
their decision making about a serious issue: surgical
resection of esophageal cancer. What we found was
unexpected. The patients told us that they did not expe-
rience shared decision making or informed consent as
experts understand these processes. This is the patients’
story, as told by them, interpreted by us, then taken back
to the patients for confirmation. We present it here to
encourage further discussion and clarification of the
consent process for treatment of life-threatening illness.
Methods
Participants. We interviewed a convenience sample of
patients who had recovered from esophagectomy for
esophageal cancer. They came from urban and rural settings
throughout the province of Ontario. Patients scheduled for
follow-up visits with thoracic surgeons at the University of
Toronto hospitals were invited by a letter from their surgeon
to participate. All of these surgeons conformed to accepted
standards of disclosure and informed consent before the oper-
ations. We excluded patients who had undergone an operation
within 8 weeks and those who did not speak English; two eli-
gible patients declined the invitation to participate. Parti-
cipants were enrolled until no new concepts arose during
analysis of successive interviews, a concept called “satura-
tion” by qualitative researchers.9
Design. Interviews with patients yielded data that we ana-
lyzed and developed into a conceptual model. This process,
called “grounded theory” by sociologists, is “a general
methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data
systematically gathered and analyzed.” It is appropriately
used for data that are conceptually dense and involve social
processes.9,10 Written informed consent was obtained from
participants. The study was approved by the research ethics
committees of the participating institutions.
Data collection. We conducted face-to-face semi-struc-
tured interviews with each participant. A spouse or family
member was often present during the interview; their com-
ments were welcomed as part of the data. The interviewer
asked open-ended questions, followed up participants’
responses, pursued themes as they arose, and sought clarifi-
cation as required. The interview guide was developed with a
pilot group of patients. Participants were asked what they
thought and felt about their experience with decision making
regarding their esophagectomy. As is common practice in
qualitative research, the interview guide was modified to fol-
low up issues emerging from the data as the study progressed.
Copies of the guide are available from us on request. The
interviews were audiotaped, transcribed, rendered anony-
mous, and kept in secure storage. 
Data analysis. The analytic method, called “constant com-
parisons,” was characterized by 3 steps: open, axial, and selec-
tive coding. During open coding, the transcripts were read and
segments of text that related to a theme or idea were identified
and given a conceptual label (eg, surgeon characteristics).
During axial coding, similar concepts were grouped into con-
ceptual categories that were developed further through com-
parisons between categories and between transcripts (eg, ide-
alized surgeon). During selective coding, one core category
emerged as the central theme of the study (entrustment), and
conceptual relationships with other categories were devel-
oped. As is customary in qualitative research, data analysis
began after the first interview and continued after all inter-
views were completed. The analysis was aided by reformat-
ting with The Ethnograph computer software.11
We used several techniques to verify the trustworthiness of
our findings. During each interview, we summarized for par-
ticipants what we thought they were saying to ensure that we
clearly understood their meaning as well as their words. The
primary analysis of the transcripts, conducted by D.K.M.,
was subjected to frequent critical discussion by both of us. At
the end of the study, we conducted a group meeting with 5
study patients to clarify our comparisons between their expe-
rience and the models of consent and decision making in the
literature and to confirm our choice of quotes to illustrate the
patient perspectives. Patients’ agreement was required to
include each element in the model. On 4 occasions we pre-
sented sections of transcripts and their interpretations to an
interdisciplinary group of scholars in law, philosophy,
bioethics, medicine, nursing, and social science, who are
members of the Consent Research Network of the University
of Toronto’s Joint Centre for Bioethics. Their comments were
used to refine our interpretations.
Results
Our patients’ sex, age, and extent of disease were
typical for patients with esophageal cancer in North
America12 (Table I). Patients with recurrent cancer were
included. A wide range of educational and cultural back-
grounds was represented. 
The concept of patient autonomy did not come up
unless the interviewer raised it. When he suggested that
textbooks of medicine,13 ethics,14,15 and law16 prescribe
the processing of information, weighing of alternatives,
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assessment of risks and benefits, and evaluation of
advice as part of the patient’s responsibility as an
autonomous decision maker, our patients rejected these
notions as inappropriate to their circumstances.
Entrustment emerged as the core concept uniting the
narratives of all our patients. Trust developed as the
patients progressed from an initial state of profound
vulnerability and distress to a feeling of confidence that
the surgeon would make good decisions on their behalf
and care for them with a high level of competence and
fidelity to their trust. The conceptual model of entrust-
ment that we developed from patients’ descriptions of
their experience contains 6 elements, illustrated here by
verbatim quotes from patient interviews:
Cultural belief in surgical cure. Nearly all of the
patients in our study came to their surgeon with a pre-
established belief that surgery is required for cure (“It’s
cancer; it has to be cut out.”). Support for this belief
consisted of anecdotes from friends or family members
with cancer in whom nonsurgical treatment seemed to
destroy the quality of their residual lives, leading to a
degrading death. In contrast, the patients knew of oth-
ers who were alive and well after surgical treatment.
We asked: “Can you remember what made you think
that you had to have surgery?”
Patient: Oh, it was the diagnosis of . . . a malignan-
cy. The faster you get at that the better. In my case
that’s the way it turned out.
Enhancement of trust through the referral
process. Patients described a series of visits to various
physicians for tests and advice. Typically, symptoms
led them to seek help from their family physician, who
indicated that something was seriously wrong and
referred them to a local specialist, usually a gastroen-
terologist or a general surgeon. After a number of tests
the local specialist diagnosed esophageal cancer, indi-
cated that a difficult and complicated surgical operation
might be necessary, and recommended referral to a spe-
cialist surgeon at a university teaching hospital.
Patients recalled that presentation of the opportunity
for them to choose among alternative treatments under-
mined their confidence that their doctors “knew what
they were doing.” The stepwise process of referral rein-
forced the patients’ conviction that the problem was
very serious and raised their expectations that the next
physician at each stage could provide a higher level of
skilled help. Our patients experienced at least two
referrals before seeing their specialist surgeon. Ac-
cording to the patients, the referring physician recom-
mended the specialist surgeon highly. Patients came to
understand that their specialist surgeon embodied the
highest available level of skill and expertise.
[The local surgeon] said, “This is a malignancy,
we’re sure of that. It requires surgery and it’s some-
thing I don’t really think I should do in [local hospital].
I think you should go to [big city] for it.” When I got
down here, the first nurse I spoke to said, “You got the
best one [surgeon].”
Idealization of the specialist surgeon. All of the
patients recounted forming deeply respectful conceptions
of their surgeon’s character and competence early in the
relationship, despite a relatively short period of interper-
sonal contact. Patients idealized the surgeon, emphasiz-
ing positive attributes and minimizing shortcomings.
Table I.  Characteristics of the patient sample (n = 36)
No. %* No. %*
Sex Occupation
Female 8 22 Working 7 19
Male 28 78 Temporarily off work 3 8
Retired 26 72
Age (median 67.5 y; range 39-83 y) Marital status
39-49 4 11 Single 2 6
50-59 5 14 Married 27 75
60-69 16 44 Separated 2 6
70-79 9 25 Divorced 1 3
80-83 2 6 Widowed 4 11
Months postop (median 13.5 mo; range 2-168 mo) Education
2-6 mo 12 33 Completed grammar school 3 8
7-12 mo 6 17 Some high school 14 39
13-24 (1-2 y) 4 11 Completed high school 4 11
25-60 (2-3 y) 5 14 Some college/university 6 17
61-96 (5-8 y) 7 19 Completed college/university 5 14
Over 97 (>8 y) 2 6 Graduate/professional degree 4 11
*Percentages do not all sum to 100 because of rounding.
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P: He’s very fast, very good. He’s always there.
Q: What made you think he was very good?
P: Oh, his manner. (What about his manner?) He’s
excellent. He’s always there. He makes you think that
he’s only there for you, while at the same time, you
know damn well that he’s got a stopwatch in his hand.
He . . . make(s) the patient feel very good that way.
Belief in expertise rather than medical informa-
tion. Patients considered themselves unqualified to
process the diagnostic and prognostic information pre-
sented to them. Regardless of their level of education or
career success, they felt incapable of making sugges-
tions or decisions about their care because they lacked
expertise and felt psychologically debilitated by anxi-
ety and fear.
I did not have a clue what they were talking about. It
would not have made any difference to me. He knows
what he is doing; let him go ahead and do it . . . . I
can’t say “No, I don’t think you should do it that way.”
As patients proceeded through the referral process to
their specialist surgeon, their anxiety and sense of
responsibility for making frightening decisions dimin-
ished, replaced by trust in the expert consultant.
Resignation to risks of treatment. Patients
expressed the view that analyzing risks was irrelevant
to their decision. They had to accept the risk and bur-
dens of surgical treatment to escape a miserable death. 
I knew that the percentage survival varied between
10% and 50% . . . . It was . . . a moot point in the sense
that not to get surgery would mean that you would pro-
ceed to the level where the odds are 0%. So did I ago-
nize? There was no agonization . . . either you go for-
ward or you fall down . . . to do nothing was to die. 
Acceptance of an expert recommendation as con-
sent to treatment. Patients did not perceive themselves
to be making an informed decision; they viewed them-
selves as accepting an expert recommendation. They
acknowledged two possible courses: (1) refuse surgical
treatment, deteriorate, suffer, and die, or (2) accept sur-
gical treatment. Since the first option was unthinkable,
their only question was whether they met the qualifica-
tions for an operation.
The patients described themselves as relieved,
encouraged, and hopeful when the surgeon recom-
mended an operation. They felt “in control” of the deci-
sion process based on trust rather than information.
P: I didn’t know what to do. I just had to go along . . . .
Q: Did you feel out of control?
P: No. Never.
Wife: He basically trusted what they said. (To P)
Didn’t you?
P: Yes, everything they said. You have to . . . what’s
the sense of going through it if you’re going to be wor-
ried? I wasn’t worried in the least when I went through
the operation.
Discussion 
The patients in our study universally described their
trust in the competence and willingness of their surgeons
to make good treatment decisions on their behalf and to
care for them with vigilance. Trust has been defined as
the “reliance on others’ competence and willingness to
look after rather than harm things one cares about which
are entrusted to their care”17; trust provides an “alterna-
tive to vigilance and rational calculation of risks, benefits,
and alternatives.”18 Across the range of characteristics of
our patients’ age, sex, level of education, experience with
medical care, and outcome of surgical treatment, the
patients consistently described the same experience of
trust in similar language. 
Gastroenterologist and New England Journal of
Medicine editor Franz Ingelfinger eloquently described
a personal experience that reflects the same feelings
our patients recalled. Ingelfinger reported how “con-
fused and emotionally distraught” he and his multi-
physician family felt when they were expected to make
decisions about his own esophageal cancer.
Our study extends and deepens the discourse opened
by earlier empirical research into patients’ views about
decision making and consent. The experience of
entrustment that our patients described helps explain
why Robinson’s cardiac surgical patients “yielded . . .
decision making to experts,”19 ignoring or forgetting20
his audiotaped preoperative discussions about risk. In
questionnaire-based studies that used hypothetical ill-
nesses of varying severity to assess decision making,
the majority of patients thought they would delegate
decision making to their doctors; more serious hypo-
thetical illness prompted greater delegation.21-23 A
*From Ingelfinger FJ. Arrogance. N Engl J Med 1980;303:1507-11.
Copyright © 1980 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights
reserved.
     Quote available in print only
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study of relatively asymptomatic outpatients in hyper-
tension clinics using structured questions and Likert
scale responses found that these patients defer to their
physicians for most decisions, especially about initial
treatment, but may prefer a more active role after hav-
ing experience with the medication.24 Our study sub-
jects were more seriously ill and our questions open-
ended; ideas and feelings such as idealization and
entrustment emerged that are outside the scope of con-
ventional questionnaires and scales.
Using qualitative methodology to evaluate patients’
views about decision making, Lidz and associates25
interviewed and observed surgical and cardiology
patients in a university hospital. They concluded that
the legal model of informed consent failed “to deal
with the realities of medical decision making.” Barriers
to incorporating the legal model into practice included
the extended time course of decision-making processes
and the tendency to disclose risks after the patient is
emotionally committed to treatment. Rather than test a
pre-established model, we used the qualitative analytic
approach to develop an explanatory description of the
patients’ experience. The resulting entrustment model
may help reconcile legal theory and medical practice in
a patient-centered direction.
The legal model of consent5,16 places heavy empha-
sis on disclosure of risk. For the patients in our study,
entrustment was the meaningful process; they signed
the consent form to satisfy requirements of the hospi-
tals in which they received their care. The standard
bioethics model defines informed consent as “the
autonomous authorization of a procedure by an indi-
vidual patient” and views enabling and protecting indi-
vidual autonomous choice as “the benchmark of moral
adequacy.”1 But the reasonable, autonomous persons
envisioned in the cool analytic atmosphere of an ethics
seminar or judge’s chamber are not the vulnerable
“sick human beings” we encountered, whose feelings
are well described in Sherlock’s insightful analysis of
“the case of Mrs. B.”7 Our patients delegated responsi-
bility for assessing medical information and making
treatment decisions to their physicians and surgeons.
This exercise of “second order autonomy,”26 that is,
making an autonomous choice to delegate decision-
making authority to a collective such as one’s church or
military organization, may logically be applied to the
physician-patient relationship.26,27
Katz28 argues that the legal doctrine of informed con-
sent “was not designed as a medical blueprint for inter-
actions between doctors and patients” but was intended
as a prod to physicians to fashion a “doctrine that is
responsive to the realities of medical practice.” Katz rec-
ommends that physicians “attend to the task of giving
meaning to the requirement of informed consent . . .
because it is they who work in the trenches.” Our data
suggest that the perspectives of sick patients should be
included in thoughtful reconsideration of informed con-
sent for serious illnesses like esophageal cancer. As we
attend to the task of developing a responsive and realis-
tic approach to informed consent, we can be guided by
the viewpoint and needs of those in the trenches with us:
patients who are anxiously entering treatment. This is
the viewpoint encountered daily by physicians and sur-
geons, as they work in the gap between legal theory and
their clinical estimate of the patients’ needs and avidity
for medical information. 
Limitations. A limitation of this study is that the
findings describe the experience of patients who elect-
ed to accept major surgery for life-threatening disease;
our study participants may have felt more vulnerable,
passive, and restricted in their choices than other
patients. In general, the selection bias introduced by
interviewing patients who have survived treatment and
chosen to participate in a study can distort assessment
of the decision-making process, especially if treatment
failures are excluded.29 However, our sample includes
several patients whose treatment was not successful.
Some knew their esophagectomies were palliative
because unresectable metastases were found at the time
of the operation. Some had recurrent cancer causing
severe symptoms at the time of their interview.
Remarkably, all of these patients reaffirmed the
entrustment model, irrespective of the outcome of
treatment. Patients with esophageal cancer who did not
follow the pathway to surgery and patients with less-
threatening disease may hold different views.
In summary, we developed a conceptual model of
entrustment from the perspective of patients undergo-
ing surgical treatment for esophageal cancer that cap-
tures their experience with decision making and con-
sent. The model contains 6 elements: (1) cultural belief
in surgical cure; (2) enhancement of trust through the
referral process; (3) idealization of the specialist sur-
geon; (4) belief in expertise rather than medical infor-
mation; (5) resignation to risks of treatment; and (6)
acceptance of an expert recommendation as consent to
treatment. Our model of entrustment should not be con-
strued as subversive to the moral and legal requirement
for communication between physicians and patients
about the risks of failure, disappointment, or harm from
treatment. The need for this respectful conversation3
remains undiminished by our findings. Further devel-
opment of legal, ethical, and policy frameworks for
decision making and consent should include reflective
analysis of patients’ experience. An effective response
to Katz’s challenge requires articulation and further
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analysis of the viewpoint of physicians and surgeons,
as well as exploration of the patients’ perspective in a
wider range of illnesses and treatments.
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Etchells, MD, Jay Katz, MD, and Abdallah Daar, MD, for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article; to
Deborah McKneally for editorial support; and to John Lantos,
MD, Fred Lowy, MD, Ezekiel Emanuel, MD, and many other
colleagues for thoughtful advice during the development of
this research project.
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